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arXiv 1101.1815cs.CR
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安全协议的形式化验证方法

Approaches to Formal Verification of Security Protocols

Suvansh Lal, Mohit Jain, Vikrant Chaplot

摘要:

近年来,已经提出了许多协议来为各种信息和通信系统提供安全性。这些协议在实际使用之前必须测试其功能的正确性。应用形式化方法验证安全协议将提高其可靠性,从而增加使用它们的系统的可用性。因此,安全协议的形式化验证已成为计算机和通信安全领域的一个关键问题。在本文中,我们提出,分析和比较一些流行的方法对安全系统的验证。我们遵循的概念-相同的目标,通过不同的方法-我们正式分析了李约瑟施罗德公钥协议的Lowe的攻击,使用我们提出的每一种方法。

英文摘要:

In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal methods for verification of security protocols would enhance their reliability thereby, increasing the usability of systems that employ them. Thus, formal verification of security protocols has become a key issue in computer and communications security. In this paper we present, analyze and compare some prevalent approaches towards verification of secure systems. We follow the notion of - same goal through different approaches - as we formally analyze the Needham Schroeder Public Key protocol for Lowe's attack using each of our presented approaches.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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