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arXiv cs/0611062cs.CR
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一种安全协议的组合验证框架

A framework for compositional verification of security protocols

Suzana Andova, Cas Cremers, Kristian Gjosteen, Sjouke Mauw, Stig F. Mjolsnes, Sasa Radomirovic

摘要:

自动安全协议分析目前仅适用于小型协议。由于较大的协议往往是由许多小协议组成,组合分析是一个有吸引力的,但不平凡的方法。我们已经开发了一个框架,一个大类的安全协议的组成分析。该框架旨在促进大型结构化安全协议的自动和手动验证。我们的方法是在一个多协议环境中验证组件协议的属性,然后推导出关于组合协议的属性。为了降低多协议验证的复杂性,我们引入了协议独立性的概念,并证明了一些定理,使独立组件协议的分析隔离。为了说明我们的框架,以现实世界的协议的适用性,我们研究了一个关键的建立序列在WiMax由三个子协议。除了少量琐碎的推理,分析是使用自动工具完成的。

英文摘要:

Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach. We have developed a framework for compositional analysis of a large class of security protocols. The framework is intended to facilitate automatic as well as manual verification of large structured security protocols. Our approach is to verify properties of component protocols in a multi-protocol environment, then deduce properties about the composed protocol. To reduce the complexity of multi-protocol verification, we introduce a notion of protocol independence and prove a number of theorems that enable analysis of independent component protocols in isolation. To illustrate the applicability of our framework to real-world protocols, we study a key establishment sequence in WiMax consisting of three subprotocols. Except for a small amount of trivial reasoning, the analysis is done using automatic tools.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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