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arXiv 1109.2066cs.CR
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UMTS保密性的形式化分析

Formal Analysis of UMTS Privacy

Myrto Arapinis, Loretta Ilaria Mancini, Eike Ritter, Mark Ryan

摘要:

移动通信设备的普遍存在和移动数据应用的持续发展(其导致高水平的移动设备的活动和交换的数据,通常对用户透明)使得隐私保护成为移动电话系统的重要特征。我们使用应用的pi演算和ProVerif工具对UMTS认证和密钥协商协议进行了正式分析。我们正式验证模型的隐私属性。我们展示了一种可链接性攻击,这使得它有可能,对于低成本设备的个人,跟踪UMTS用户。该攻击利用了设计不当的错误消息泄露的信息。

英文摘要:

The ubiquitous presence of mobile communication devices and the continuous development of mo- bile data applications, which results in high level of mobile devices' activity and exchanged data, often transparent to the user, makes privacy preservation an important feature of mobile telephony systems. We present a formal analysis of the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement protocol, using the applied pi-calculus and the ProVerif tool. We formally verify the model with respect to privacy properties. We show a linkability attack which makes it possible, for individuals with low-cost equipment, to trace UMTS subscribers. The attack exploits information leaked by poorly designed error messages.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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