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arXiv 1608.04273cs.GT
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广义指派问题:真实的无金钱机制设计

Generalized Assignment Problem: Truthful Mechanism Design without Money

Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler

摘要:

本文研究了无支付和无先验环境下广义指派问题(GAP)的一个策略变体的真实机制设计问题。在GAP中,一组项目必须被最优地分配给一组bin,而不超过任何单个bin的容量。在我们研究的问题的战略变体中,箱子由战略代理人持有,每个代理人可能会隐藏其与某些项目的兼容性,以获得更高价值的项目。代理和物品之间的兼容性编码代理接收物品的意愿。我们的目标是最大化总价值(代理价值的总和,或社会福利),同时证明没有代理可以从隐藏其与物品的兼容性中获益。该模型可应用于有预算投标人的拍卖。对于问题的两个变体,即\emph{multiple knapsack problem}中的每个项目具有相同的大小和值的箱子,和\emph{density-invariant GAP}中的每个项目具有相同的值密度的箱子,我们提出了真实的$4$ -近似算法。对于一般的问题,我们提出了一个$O(\ln{(U/L)})$ -近似机制,其中$U$和$L$是兼容项目箱对的值密度的上界和下界。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we study a problem of truthful mechanism design for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-free environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic variant of the problem we study, bins are held by strategic agents, and each agent may hide its compatibility with some items in order to obtain items of higher values. The compatibility between an agent and an item encodes the willingness of the agent to receive the item. Our goal is to maximize total value (sum of agents' values, or social welfare) while certifying no agent can benefit from hiding its compatibility with items. The model has applications in auctions with budgeted bidders. For two variants of the problem, namely \emph{multiple knapsack problem} in which each item has the same size and value over bins, and \emph{density-invariant GAP} in which each item has the same value density over the bins, we propose truthful $4$-approximation algorithms. For the general problem, we propose an $O(\ln{(U/L)})$-approximation mechanism where $U$ and $L$ are the upper and lower bounds for value densities of the compatible item-bin pairs.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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