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arXiv 1202.1231cs.GTmath.CO
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为度量设施选址问题中的官僚主义辩护

In Defense of Bureaucracy in the Metric Facility Location Problem

Nick Gravin, Dominik Scheder

摘要:

我们的工作是致力于度量设施选址问题,并解决自私的行为的球员。它有助于Procaccia和Tennenholtz [EC 09]在没有资金的情况下进行近似机制设计。我们探索并论证了一个直观而简单的复杂度为O(nk)的规则,即所谓的比例机制。该机制在连续的k轮中工作,每次选择一个随机玩家放置下一个设施;每次被选中的玩家的概率与他们到当前设施集的距离成比例分布。Lu等人[EC 10]表明,比例规则对于k= 1,2是激励相容的,但对于k>2则不是。我们稍微调整了模型,使得对于任何k,比例机制变得激励相容。在新的模式中,我们允许政府是官僚主义的,即,有能力迫使每个玩家只能从一组特定的可用设施中进行选择。在比例机制中,我们强制每个在其报告位置接收设施的玩家连接到该设施。我们将比例机制扩展到一个更一般的设置,一个私人网络的设施已经存在于度量空间,并表明它是真实的。我们进一步表明,对于任何固定的k,比例规则达到预期的恒定近似保证最优解,即最多4k的比率。另一方面,我们给出了ln k(1+o(1))的一个下界,我们怀疑事实更接近这个下界。因此,我们的工作是第一个激励兼容的设施位置,有效地对待(一个常数的近似因子)的一般情况下,任意数量的设施。

英文摘要:

Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players. It contributes to the line of work initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [EC09] on approximate mechanism design without money. We explore and argue for an intuitive and simple rule of complexity O(nk),a so-called proportionality mechanism. The mechanism works in k consecutive rounds,each time choosing a random player at whose position to place the next facility; each time the probabilities of players to be picked are distributed proportionally to their distances to the current set of the facilities. Lu et al. [EC10] showed that the proportionality rule is incentive compatible for k=1,2, but fails to be so for k>2. We tweak the model slightly such that for any k, the proportionality mechanism becomes incentive compatible. In the new model we allow the government to be bureaucratic, i.e., to have the power of to force each player to choose from only a specific set of available facilities. In the proportionality mechanism, we force every player that receives a facility at his reported location to connect to exactly that facility. We extend the proportionality mechanism to a more general setting with a private network of facilities already present in the metric space and show that it is truthful as well. We further show that for any fixed k, the proportionality rule achieves in expectation a constant approximation guarantee to the optimal solution; namely at most a ratio of 4k. On the other hand, we show a lower bound of ln k(1+o(1)), and we suspect the truth to be closer to this lower bound. Thus, our work is the first among those on incentive compatible facility location that treats effectively (with a constant factor of approximation) the general case of an arbitrary number of facilities.

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