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arXiv 1202.3751cs.GTcs.AI
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具有战略资源的市场动态机制设计

Dynamic Mechanism Design for Markets with Strategic Resources

Indian Institute of Science(印度科学学院);Xerox Research Centre Europe(施乐欧洲研究中心)

Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Yadati Narahari, Christopher R. Dance

摘要:

当任务所有者和资源都具有策略性时,任务到多个资源的分配成为一个有趣的博弈论问题。在经典的,非战略性的设置,其中的任务和资源的状态是可观察的控制器,这个问题是找到一个最佳的政策马尔可夫决策过程(MDP)。当状态由战略代理人持有时,有效的任务分配问题超出了解决MDP的问题,而成为设计机制的问题。出于这一事实,我们提出了一个通用的机制,决定的任务和资源的分配规则和支付规则,以激励代理的参与和真实的报告。在最近的文献中研究的相关动态战略控制问题相比,这里研究的问题具有相互依赖的价值:分配给任务所有者的利益不仅仅是任务本身和分配的特性的函数,而且是资源的状态。我们引入了一个动态扩展Mezzetti的两阶段机制相互依存的估值。在这种变化的背景下,所提出的动力机制是有效的,期内事后激励相容,期内事后个体理性。

英文摘要:

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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