资源分配机制设计及其在集中式多商品路由中的应用
Mechanism design for resource allocation with applications to centralized multi-commodity routing
摘要：
我们制定和研究的算法机制设计问题的一般类的资源分配设置，中心重新分配个人带来的私人资源。资金转移是禁止的。有别于标准文献，它假设个人带来的资源量是公共信息，我们认为这个量作为代理的私人，可能是多维类型。我们的目标是设计真实的机制，实现两个目标：最大最小和帕累托效率。对于每一个目标，我们提供了一个减少任何最佳算法转换成一个策略证明机制，实现相同的目标。我们的约简不检查输入算法，而只是将这些算法作为神谕查询。应用减少，我们产生的战略证明机制在一个不平凡的应用：网络路由分配。我们的模型和应用结果本身就很有价值。
英文摘要：
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the standard literature, which assumes the amount of resources brought by an individual to be public information, we consider this amount as an agent's private, possibly multi-dimensional type. Our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that achieve two objectives: max-min and Pareto efficiency. For each objective, we provide a reduction that converts any optimal algorithm into a strategy-proof mechanism that achieves the same objective. Our reductions do not inspect the input algorithms but only query these algorithms as oracles. Applying the reductions, we produce strategy-proof mechanisms in a non-trivial application: network route allocation. Our models and result in the application are valuable on their own rights.
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