arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1604.01529cs.GTcs.DM
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委员会评分规则的公理化刻画

Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules

Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko

摘要:

委员会评分规则形成投票者偏好的丰富类别的聚合器,用于选择具有期望属性的对象的子集,例如,面试候选人的最后名单,议会等代表性集体机构,或一组公共设施的一组位置。在著名的年轻的表征结果,公理化的单赢家评分规则的精神,我们提供了一个公理化的表征多赢家委员会的评分规则。我们表明,委员会评分规则-尽管形成了一个非常普遍的一类规则-的特点是由一套四个标准公理,匿名性,中立性,一致性和连续性,并由一个公理特定的多赢家规则,我们称之为委员会的优势。在我们的证明过程中,我们开发了一些新的概念和技术。特别是,我们介绍和公理化的特点多赢家决策评分规则,一类规则,广泛推广了众所周知的多数关系。

英文摘要:

Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such as a parliament, or a set of locations for a set of public facilities. In the spirit of celebrated Young's characterization result that axiomatizes single-winner scoring rules, we provide an axiomatic characterization of multiwinner committee scoring rules. We show that committee scoring rules---despite forming a remarkably general class of rules---are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, consistency and continuity, and by one axiom specific to multiwinner rules which we call committee dominance. In the course of our proof, we develop several new notions and techniques. In particular, we introduce and axiomatically characterize multiwinner decision scoring rules, a class of rules that broadly generalizes the well-known majority relation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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