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arXiv 1507.08339math.OCmath.PR
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平均场环境下的检验博弈

Inspection games in a mean field setting

Vassili Kolokoltsov, Wei Yang

摘要:

在本文中,我们提出了一个新的发展,检查游戏中的平均场设置。在我们的动态版本的检查游戏中,有一个检查员和大量的N个相互作用的被检查者与有限的状态空间。通过应用平均场博弈方法,我们提出了一个解决方案,作为这种类型的检查游戏的ε-均衡,其中N趋于无穷大时,ε趋于0。为了便于对这种新型的检查博弈进行数值分析,我们进行了近似分析,即用光滑切换策略来近似最优Lipschitz连续切换策略。我们表明,任何近似的平滑切换策略也是一个ε平衡的解决方案,检查游戏与一个大的和有限数量N的被检查者与检查的顺序为1/N。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we present a new development of inspection games in a mean field setting. In our dynamic version of an inspection game, there is one inspector and a large number N interacting inspectees with a finite state space. By applying the mean field game methodology, we present a solution as an epsilon-equilibrium to this type of inspection games, where epsilon goes to 0 as N tends to infinity. In order to facilitate numerical analysis of this new type inspection game, we conduct an approximation analysis, that is we approximate the optimal Lipschitz continuous switching strategies by smooth switching strategies. We show that any approximating smooth switching strategy is also an epsilon-equilibrium solution to the inspection game with a large and finite number N of inspectees with epsilon being of order 1/N.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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