arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2005.13527math.OCcs.MA
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随机势博弈

Stochastic Potential Games

David Mguni

摘要:

计算N人非零和随机对策的纳什均衡是一个艰巨的挑战。目前,随机博弈论中的算法方法无法计算NE的随机对策(SGs)的设置,但在极端情况下,球员要么发挥作为一个团队或有截然相反的目标,在两个球员的设置。这极大地阻碍了SG框架在经济学和实际系统中的许多问题的应用。在本文中,我们提供了一种方法来计算纳什均衡在非零和设置和人口的球员超过两个。特别是,我们确定了一个子集的SGs称为随机潜在的游戏(SPGs)的(马尔可夫完美)纳什均衡可以计算可追踪的,在多项式时间。不像SGs,在一般情况下,计算NE是PSPACE硬,我们表明,SGs与潜在的属性是P-完全的。我们进一步证明了对于每个SPG都存在一个对偶马尔可夫决策过程,其解与SPG的MP-NE一致。最后,我们提供的算法,可追溯计算的MP-NE的SG与两个以上的球员。

英文摘要:

Computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-player non-zerosum stochastic games is a formidable challenge. Currently, algorithmic methods in stochastic game theory are unable to compute NE for stochastic games (SGs) for settings in all but extreme cases in which the players either play as a team or have diametrically opposed objectives in a two-player setting. This greatly impedes the application of the SG framework to numerous problems within economics and practical systems of interest. In this paper, we provide a method of computing Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum settings and for populations of players more than two. In particular, we identify a subset of SGs known as stochastic potential games (SPGs) for which the (Markov perfect) Nash equilibrium can be computed tractably and in polynomial time. Unlike SGs for which, in general, computing the NE is PSPACE-hard, we show that SGs with the potential property are P-Complete. We further demonstrate that for each SPG there is a dual Markov decision process whose solution coincides with the MP-NE of the SPG. We lastly provide algorithms that tractably compute the MP-NE for SGs with more than two players.

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