网络安全的演化、平均场和压力-阻力博弈模型
Evolutionary, Mean-Field and Pressure-Resistance Game Modelling of Networks Security
摘要：
最近开发的网络安全中腐败和僵尸网络防御的平均场对策模型、检查和腐败的进化博弈方法以及抗压对策元素可以结合在一起。大量难以区分的小参与者与主要参与者互动的扩展模型下，重点研究安全和预防犯罪。在本文中，我们介绍了这样一个一般性的框架，复杂的互动网络结构中的许多球员，其中包括个人决策内的环境（平均场游戏组件），二元互动（进化游戏组件），和干扰的主要球员（压力阻力游戏组件）。为了用这个复杂的模型进行具体的计算，我们在三个基本的渐近状态下工作：个人决策的快速执行，二元交互的小比率，以及时间上的小回报折扣。通过这种方法，我们构造了一类具有所谓的收费公路性质的解决方案。
英文摘要：
The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of interaction of large number of indistinguishable small players against a major player, with focus on the study of security and crime prevention. In this paper we introduce such a general framework for complex interaction in network structures of many players, that incorporates individual decision making inside the environment (the mean-field game component), binary interaction (the evolutionary game component), and the interference of a principal player (the pressure-resistance game component). To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model we work in three basic asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time. By this approach we construct a class of solutions having the so-called turnpike property.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
