反馈演化博弈中公共资源治理的惩罚与监督
Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game
摘要：
利用公共资源一直是社区成员的两难选择。当合作者约束自己并考虑资源的适当状态时，背叛者要求比他们想象的份额更多的回报。为了避免共同国家的悲剧，惩罚后者似乎是一个适当的反应。然而，当我们承认资源是有限的，即使是可再生资源的增长能力也有限时，这一结论就不那么直截了当了。为了澄清可能的后果，我们考虑了一个共同进化模型，在该模型中，除了合作者和背叛者的收益驱动竞争外，可再生资源的水平敏感地取决于合作者的比例和所有参与者的总消费。应用反馈进化博弈表明，除了一个微妙的调整惩罚，它也是至关重要的，合作者应特别注意可再生资源的不断增长的能力。否则，即使使用严厉的惩罚，也不能挽救社区免于不受欢迎的结局。
英文摘要：
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
