检查和预防犯罪：一个演变的视角
Inspection and crime prevention: an evolutionary perspective
摘要：
在本文中，我们分析了检查游戏与进化的角度。在我们的大种群进化检验博弈中，每个个体都不是理性的收益最大化者，而是在感知到其他个体的策略比自己的策略更成功时，周期性地更新自己的策略，即策略受到进化压力的影响。我们把这个游戏发展成几个方向。首先，社会规范被纳入到游戏中，我们分析了社会规范如何影响个人的倾向，从事犯罪行为。第二，要考虑一个前瞻性的督察，即督察选择执法水平，同时考虑到这种选择将对未来犯罪率的影响。最后，将该博弈推广到具有连续策略空间的情形。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large population, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but periodically updates his strategy if he perceives that other individuals' strategies are more successful than his own, namely strategies are subject to the evolutionary pressure. We develop this game into a few directions. Firstly, social norms are incorporated into the game and we analyse how social norms may influence individuals' propensity to engage in criminal behaviour. Secondly, a forward-looking inspector is considered, namely, the inspector chooses the level of law enforcement whilst taking into account the effect that this choice will have on future crime rates. Finally, the game is extended to the one with continuous strategy spaces.
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