arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1504.06744cs.GT
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失败下的数量博弈

Quantitative Games under Failures

Thomas Brihaye, Gilles Geeraerts, Axel Haddad, Benjamin Monmege, Guillermo A. Pérez, Gabriel Renault

摘要:

我们研究了一个概括的破坏游戏,一个模型的动态网络游戏介绍了范Bentham。游戏的原始定义本质上是有限的,因此不允许对无限过程进行建模。我们提出了一个扩展的破坏游戏中,第一个球员(亚军)穿越一个舞台上的动态权重确定的第二个球员(破坏者)。在我们的定量破坏游戏模型中,破坏者现在得到一个预算,他可以在图的边缘之间分配,而跑步者试图在完成任务的同时最小化预算的数量。我们表明,一方面,对于大多数经典的成本函数,在文献中考虑,确定如果亚军有一个策略,以确保成本低于某个阈值的问题是EXPTIME完全的。另一方面,如果破坏者的预算是先验固定的,那么对于大多数成本函数,问题都在PTIME中。最后,我们表明,限制游戏的动态也会导致更好的复杂性。

英文摘要:

We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games introduced by van Benthem. The original definition of the game is inherently finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose an extension of the sabotage games in which the first player (Runner) traverses an arena with dynamic weights determined by the second player (Saboteur). In our model of quantitative sabotage games, Saboteur is now given a budget that he can distribute amongst the edges of the graph, whilst Runner attempts to minimise the quantity of budget witnessed while completing his task. We show that, on the one hand, for most of the classical cost functions considered in the literature, the problem of determining if Runner has a strategy to ensure a cost below some threshold is EXPTIME-complete. On the other hand, if the budget of Saboteur is fixed a priori, then the problem is in PTIME for most cost functions. Finally, we show that restricting the dynamics of the game also leads to better complexity.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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