具有多重线故障的Hotelling对策
Hotelling Games with Multiple Line Faults
摘要:
霍特林游戏由n个服务器组成,每个服务器在线段上选择一个点,以最大限度地吸引客户端。客户端沿线路均匀分布,每个客户端从最近的服务器购买。在本文中,我们研究了一个容易出错的版本的霍特林游戏,在多个随机位置的行失败。每次故障都会断开线路,阻塞客户端的通道。我们表明,游戏承认一个纳什均衡,当且仅当故障率超过一定的阈值,并计算该阈值近似。此外,当一个纳什均衡存在,我们证明它是唯一的,并明确地构建它。因此,有些令人惊讶的是,潜在的失败对游戏有稳定作用(只要有足够的失败)。此外,我们还研究了游戏的社会成本(以客户端的总运输成本来衡量),这在某种意义上似乎也受益于潜在的失败。
英文摘要:
The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are uniformly distributed along the line, and each client buys from the closest server. In this paper, we study a fault-prone version of the Hotelling game, where the line fails at multiple random locations. Each failure disconnects the line, blocking the passage of clients. We show that the game admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if the rate of faults exceeds a certain threshold, and calculate that threshold approximately. Moreover, when a Nash equilibrium exists we show it is unique and construct it explicitly. Hence, somewhat surprisingly, the potential occurrence of failures has a stabilizing effect on the game (provided there are enough of them). Additionally, we study the social cost of the game (measured in terms of the total transportation cost of the clients), which also seems to benefit in a certain sense from the potential presence of failures.
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