纯Hotelling对策中消费者的一般分布
General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
摘要：
一个纯粹的霍特林博弈是一个有限数量的玩家之间的竞争，他们同时选择一个位置，以吸引尽可能多的消费者。在本文中，我们研究的情况下，一般分布的消费者在网络上产生的度量图。由于玩家不进行价格竞争，消费者连续体会在离玩家最近的地方购物。在关于分布的正则性假设下，证明了纯策略中ε-均衡的存在性，并构造了ε-均衡，条件是局中人数目大于一个下界.
英文摘要：
A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player's location. Under regularity hypothesis on the distribution we prove the existence of an epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies and we construct it, provided that the number of players is larger than a lower bound.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
