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arXiv 2102.12820cs.GT
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一个脆弱的多CPR游戏

A Fragile multi-CPR Game

Christos Pelekis, Panagiotis Promponas, Juan Alvarado, Eirini-Eleni Tsiropoulou, Symeon Papavassiliou

摘要:

脆弱CPR游戏是资源共享游戏的一个实例,其中公共池资源在几个玩家之间共享,该公共池资源由于过度使用而易于失败。每个参与者都有一个固定的初始禀赋,并面临着在不迫使其破产的情况下投资于公共资源池的任务。从公共池资源的回报是受不确定性,并认为由球员在前景理论的方式。它显示在[A]中。R.~霍塔,S.~ Garg,S.~ Sundaram,\textit{Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes},游戏与经济行为\textbf{98}(2016)135- 164.]在一些温和的假设下,一个脆弱的心肺复苏博弈存在唯一的纳什均衡。在这篇文章中,我们研究了一个扩展版本的脆弱心肺复苏术游戏,其中允许玩家共享多个公共池资源,这些资源也容易因过度使用而失败。我们把这个游戏称为脆弱的多CPR游戏。我们的主要结果表明,在一些温和的假设下,一个脆弱的多CPR游戏承认一个广义纳什均衡。此外,我们表明,当有更多的球员比公共池资源,集合组成的所有广义纳什均衡的脆弱多CPR游戏是勒贝格测度为零。

英文摘要:

A Fragile CPR Game is an instance of a resource sharing game where a common-pool resource, which is prone to failure due to overuse, is shared among several players. Each player has a fixed initial endowment and is faced with the task of investing in the common-pool resource without forcing it to fail. The return from the common-pool resource is subject to uncertainty and is perceived by the players in a prospect-theoretic manner. It is shown in [A.~R.~Hota, S.~Garg, S.~Sundaram, \textit{Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes}, Games and Economic Behavior \textbf{98} (2016) 135--164.] that, under some mild assumptions, a Fragile CPR Game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. In this article we investigate an extended version of a Fragile CPR Game, in which players are allowed to share multiple common-pool resources that are also prone to failure due to overuse. We refer to this game as a Fragile multi-CPR Game. Our main result states that, under some mild assumptions, a Fragile multi-CPR Game admits a Generalized Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we show that, when there are more players than common-pool resources, the set consisting of all Generalized Nash equilibria of a Fragile multi-CPR Game is of Lebesgue measure zero.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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