The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal." The logical properties of this modality depend on whether the modal language allows the empty coalition. The main technical results are a completeness theorem for a logical system with the empty coalition, a strong completeness theorem for the logical system without the empty coalition, and an incompleteness theorem which shows that there is no strongly complete logical system in the language with the empty coalition.
The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect recall is captured in the system by a single axiom. The main technical results are the soundness and the completeness theorems for the proposed logical system.
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
NICTA（澳大利亚国家信息与通信技术研究院）；University of New South Wales（新南威尔士大学）；University of Oxford（牛津大学）；Université Paris-Dauphine（巴黎第九大学）
We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions. The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player is indifferent between satisfactory coalitions, and is indifferent between unsatisfacto…
ShanghaiTech University（上海科技大学）；Ben-Gurion University of the Negev（内盖夫本-古里安大学）；Ariel University（阿里埃勒大学）
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in advance. This paper studies a new setting (a task allocation problem) where the characteristic function is not known and it is controlled by some private information from the players. Hence, the challenge here is twofold: (i) incentivize players to reveal their private information truthfully, (ii) incentivize them to collaborate together. We show that existing …
University of British Columbia（英属哥伦比亚大学）；Claremont McKenna College（克莱蒙特麦肯纳学院）
A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been previously suggested that the cost of prevention, or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure the degree of blameworthiness. The paper adopts this approach and proposes a modal logical system for reasoning about the degree of blameworthiness. The main technical result is a completeness theorem for the proposed system.
Microsoft Research（微软研究院）；University of Southampton（南安普顿大学）；Nanyang Technological University（南洋理工大学）；Hebrew University（希伯来大学）；Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf（杜塞尔多夫海因里希·海涅大学）
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition (or, more generally, a particul…
Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve on their own. Previous work has shown problems in coalitional games to be computationally hard. Wooldridge and Dunne (Artificial Intelligence 2006) studied the classical computational complexity of several natural decision problems in Coalitional Resource Games (CRG) - games in which each agent is endowed with a set of resources and coalitions can bring about a set of goals if they are collectively endowed with the necessary amount of resources. The i…
The paper investigates the second-order blameworthiness or duty to warn modality "one coalition knew how another coalition could have prevented an outcome". The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the distributed knowledge and the duty to warn modalities.
TOBB University of Economics and Technology（TOBB经济与技术大学）；Özyeğin University（厄兹耶因大学）
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games with identical and increasing cost functions, i.e., each agent tries to utilize from the least crowded resource in her accessible subset of resources. Our main contribution is a novel approach for proving the existence of equilibrium outcomes that are resilient to weakly improving deviations: $(i)$ by singletons (Nash equilibria), $(ii)$ by the grand coalition (Pareto efficiency), and $(iii)$ by coalitions with respect to an a priori given partition coalition structure (partition equilibria). To the best of our knowledge, this is the stronges…
Cooperative Game-Theoretic Credit Assignment for Multi-Agent Policy Gradients via the Core
Key Laboratory of Intelligence, Games and Information Processing in Shaanxi Province（陕西省智能信息处理重点实验室）；Unmanned System Research Institute（无人系统研究院）；Northwestern Polytechnical University（西北工业大学）；School of Mathematics and Statistics（数学与统计学院）；Information Science Academy（信息科学学院）；China Electronics Technology Group Corporation（中国电子科技集团有限公司）
Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering（电气与计算机工程系）；New York University Tandon School of Engineering（纽约大学塔恩工程学院）；Brooklyn, NY, USA（布鲁克林，纽约，美国）
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University（香港理工大学）；Beijing Institute of Technology（北京理工大学）
Facing the challenge of statistical diversity in client local data distribution, personalized federated learning (PFL) has become a growing research hotspot. Although the state-of-the-art methods with model similarity-based pairwise collaboration have achieved promising performance, they neglect the fact that model aggregation is essentially a collaboration process within the coalition, where the complex multiwise influences take place among clients. In this paper, we first apply Shapley value (SV) from coalition game theory into the PFL scenario. To measure the multiwise collaboration among a…
