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arXiv 1504.05696cs.AI
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将意识赋予人工智能

Ascribing Consciousness to Artificial Intelligence

Imperial College London(伦敦帝国理工学院)

Murray Shanahan

摘要:

本文批判性地评估了集成信息论(IIT)的某些倡导者所采取的关于意识的反功能主义立场,其推论是,在传统计算硬件上实现的人类水平的人工智能不一定是有意识的。批评借鉴了一个著名的逐渐神经元替代思想实验的变化,以及在IIT的自我知识的治疗带来了紧张局势。然而,其目的既不是完全拒绝IIT,也不是特别支持功能主义。更确切地说,这两种观点都有一些东西可以提供对意识的科学理解,只要它们不被打扮成虚幻的形而上学问题的解决方案。至于人类水平的人工智能,我们必须等待它的发展,然后才能决定是否将意识赋予它。

英文摘要:

This paper critically assesses the anti-functionalist stance on consciousness adopted by certain advocates of integrated information theory (IIT), a corollary of which is that human-level artificial intelligence implemented on conventional computing hardware is necessarily not conscious. The critique draws on variations of a well-known gradual neuronal replacement thought experiment, as well as bringing out tensions in IIT's treatment of self-knowledge. The aim, though, is neither to reject IIT outright nor to champion functionalism in particular. Rather, it is suggested that both ideas have something to offer a scientific understanding of consciousness, as long as they are not dressed up as solutions to illusory metaphysical problems. As for human-level AI, we must await its development before we can decide whether or not to ascribe consciousness to it.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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