聪明到足以灭绝？对通用智能价值的进化挑战及其对AGI的伦理影响
Smart Enough to Go Extinct? An Evolutionary Challenge to the Value of General Intelligence and Its Ethical Implications for AGI
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文批判性审视AGI的核心前提，提出通用智能或为唯一会威胁自身物种的生物策略，即使对齐良好的AGI也会继承该缺陷，进而引发构建AGI与创造人工意识的伦理问题。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
追求人工通用智能（AGI）基于一个看似不证自明的前提：通用智能，即智人所具备的灵活、适用于各领域的认知能力，具有极高的价值。本文对这一前提进行批判性审视。我们首先阐述通用智能价值的直观依据，随后提出进化层面的挑战。我们认为，在进化时间尺度上，通用智能的适应价值远未得到实证确立。从蓝细菌到马蹄蟹，众多类群在没有类似通用智能的情况下已存续了数亿甚至数十亿年，而智人仅存在约30万年就已面临自身引发的生存风险。大规模灭绝事件并不偏向认知复杂的物种。我们提出，通用智能或许是唯一会对自身物种产生生存威胁的生物策略，这是一种在非智能生存策略中没有对应案例的生存风险悖论。与主流将AI风险归咎于对齐问题的观点不同，我们将其根源定位在通用智能自身的结构特征上，这意味着即使是对齐良好的AGI也会继承这一缺陷。如果通用智能的长期进化价值不确定或为负，这就引发了关于构建AGI、且更紧迫的是创造人工意识的伦理问题。基于义务论伦理和预防原则，我们认为这种不确定性要求我们承担谨慎的责任：如果我们创造了一种新型智能存在，我们有责任确保其能蓬勃发展的条件。
英文摘要
The pursuit of artificial general intelligence (AGI) rests on a seemingly self-evident premise: that general intelligence, the kind of flexible, domain-general cognitive capacity exemplified by Homo sapiens, is extraordinarily valuable. This paper subjects this premise to critical scrutiny. We first present the intuitive case for the value of general intelligence before mounting an evolutionary challenge. We argue that, on evolutionary timescales, its adaptive value is far from empirically established. Numerous taxa, from cyanobacteria to horseshoe crabs, have persisted for hundreds of millions or even billions of years without anything resembling general intelligence, while Homo sapiens has existed for roughly 300,000 years and already faces self-generated existential risks. Mass extinction events do not preferentially favour cognitively sophisticated species. We argue that general intelligence may be the only biological strategy that generates existential threats to the species possessing it, an existential risk paradox with no parallel among non-intelligent survival strategies. Unlike prevailing accounts of AI risk that trace the danger to misalignment, we locate it in structural features of general intelligence itself, implying that even well-aligned AGI would inherit this liability. If the long-term evolutionary value of general intelligence is uncertain or negative, this raises ethical questions about engineering AGI and, more urgently, creating artificial consciousness. Drawing on deontological ethics and the precautionary principle, we argue that this uncertainty imposes a duty of caution: if we create a new kind of intelligent being, we bear responsibility for ensuring the conditions under which it can flourish.
发表机构
- Hochschule der Medien Stuttgart（斯图加特传媒学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
