发表机构
University of California, Los Angeles（加州大学洛杉矶分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文提出一个因果框架来评估关于人工意识的证据类比，区分产生意识的因素相似性与行为效应相似性，并指出行为相似性对AI意识仅提供有限证据。
AI 中文摘要
谁或什么是有意识的？由于主观体验仅在第一人称中可直接访问，对其他实体意识的判断部分依赖于类比。历史上，此类推断集中于非人类动物，但人工智能的进步提出了有意识AI的可能性。在此，我们开发了一个因果框架来评估此类证据类比。关键区别在于可能参与产生意识的因素中的相似性与下游行为或认知效应中的相似性。我们的框架通过因果相关性对源-目标相似性进行加权，同时允许未知原因、致残差异和通往意识的其他途径。应用于生物系统，它解释了为什么类比支持通常随着与人类因果距离的增加而减弱。应用于当代AI，它表明行为相似性仅为意识提供有限证据，因为相关的因果对应关系仍未被充分确立。该框架还阐明了哪些证据会加强人工意识的主张。
英文摘要
Who or what is conscious? Because subjective experience is directly accessible only in the first person, judgments about consciousness in other entities depend partly on analogy. Historically, such inferences have focused on nonhuman animals, but advances in artificial intelligence have raised the possibility of conscious AI. Here we develop a causal framework for evaluating such evidential analogies. The key distinction is between similarities in factors plausibly involved in generating consciousness and similarities in downstream behavioural or cognitive effects. Our framework weights source-target similarity by causal relevance while allowing for unknown causes, disabling differences and alternative routes to consciousness. Applied to biological systems, it explains why analogical support generally weakens with increasing causal distance from humans. Applied to contemporary AI, it suggests that behavioural similarity provides only limited evidence for consciousness because relevant causal correspondences remain poorly established. The framework also clarifies what evidence would strengthen claims of artificial consciousness.
Comments11 pages, 1 figure, 2 boxes
