We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.
Unveil Sources of Uncertainty: Feature Contribution to Conformal Prediction Intervals
Département de Mathématiques, Université du Québec à Montréal(魁北克大学蒙特利尔分校数学系);Institut Intelligence et Données, Université Laval(拉瓦尔大学智能与数据研究所);CNRS - Université de Montréal(法国国家科学研究中心-蒙特利尔大学);CRM – CNRS Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France(法国国家科学研究中心-阿维尼昂大学)
History-Aware and Dynamic Client Contribution in Federated Learning
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Germany(马克斯·普朗克软件系统研究所,德国);Univ. Lille, Inria, CNRS, Centrale Lille, UMR 9189 - CRIStAL, France(里尔大学,法国);Institute of High Performance Computing (IHPC), Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore(高性能计算研究所(IHPC),新加坡);EVYD Technology, Singapore(EVYD技术公司,新加坡)
New allocation rule based on graph structures and their application to economic phenomena
Interdisciplinary Faculty of Science and Engineering, Shimane University(岛根大学理工学综合研究科);Faculty of Economics, Chuo University(中央大学经济学部);MUFG Bank, Ltd.(三菱UFJ银行)
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Multi-Objective Resource Sharing and Allocation in Mobile Edge Clouds
移动边缘计算寻求为不同的延迟敏感应用提供资源。然而,将有限的边缘资源分配给多个应用是一个具有挑战性的问题。为了缓解资源稀缺问题,我们建议在多个边缘计算服务提供商之间共享资源,其中每个服务提供商都有特定的效用需要优化。我们将资源分配和共享问题建模为多目标优化问题,并提出了一个基于\emph{Cooperative Game Theory}(CGT)的框架,其中每个边缘服务提供商首先满足其本地应用程序,然后与其他提供商的用户共享其剩余资源(如果可用)。此外,我们提出了一个$\mathcal{O}(N)$算法,提供从\emph{core}分配决策,因此获得的分配是\emph{Pareto}最优的和所有的服务提供商的大联盟是稳定的。实验结果表明,我们提出的资源分配和共享框架,提高了效用的所有服务提供商的情况下,服务提供商单独工作(没有资源共享)。与\emph{Shapley value}算法相比,我们的$\mathcal{O}(N)$算法降低了从核心获得解的时间复杂度,降低了71.67\%.
Quid Pro Quo allocations in Production-Inventory games
在瓜迪奥拉等人(2009)中引入的欧文点概念是一个有吸引力的解决方案概念,对于生产库存游戏(PI游戏)来说,它始终属于其核心。欧文点允许游戏中的所有玩家以最低成本运营,但它没有考虑到重要玩家对其追随者(粉丝)的成本降低。因此,它可以被视为一种利他主义的分配,为基本的球员,什么可以批评。本文的目的是双重的:研究PI-游戏的核心的结构和复杂性,并引入新的PI-游戏的核心分配,改善欧文点的弱点。关于第一个目标,我们进一步的PI-游戏的分析,我们分析其核心结构和算法的复杂性。具体地说,我们证明了PI-游戏的核心的极端点的数量是指数的球员的数量。另一方面,我们提出并描述了一个新的核心分配,欧米茄点,它补偿了重要的球员,他们的作用,减少他们的球迷的成本。此外,我们定义了另一个解决方案的概念,Quid Pro Quo集(QPQ集)的分配,这是基于欧文和欧米茄点。在所有的分配在这个集合中,我们强调我们所谓的Solomonic QPQ分配,我们提供了一些必要的条件,该分配与Shapley值和核仁的重合。