基于改进Shapley值与DEA交叉效率的共同收益分配
The common revenue allocation based on modified Shapley value and DEA cross-efficiency
AI总结:
针对联盟共同收益的公平分配问题,结合DEA交叉效率与合作博弈理论构建改进Shapley值,同时考虑乐观与悲观情形得到收益分配上下界,并通过数值算例及城商行实证验证了方法的可行性。
摘要:
本文研究如何为联盟共同收益设计公平合理的分配方案。我们将待分配的共同收益视为不参与后续生产过程的外生变量,生产组织可相互合作并组建联盟。由于DEA(数据包络分析)交叉效率结合了自评与互评机制,合作博弈允许参与者间公平协商,因此我们将交叉效率与合作博弈理论相结合,构建了改进Shapley值,以反映被评估参与者对联盟的贡献。此外,针对每个参与者,我们同时考虑了乐观与悲观两种改进Shapley值,相应得到分配收益的上下界。文中通过一个数值算例说明了该方法的操作流程,最后将该方法应用于中国某拥有18家分支机构的城市商业银行的实证案例中。
英文摘要:
How to design a fair and reasonable allocation plan for the common revenue of the alliance is considered in this paper. We regard the common revenue to be allocated as an exogenous variable which will not participate in the subsequent production process. The production organizations can cooperate with each other and form alliances. As the DEA cross-efficiency combines self- and peer-evaluation mechanisms, and the cooperative game allows fair negotiation among participants, we combine the cross-efficiency with the cooperative game theory and construct the modified Shapley value to reflect the contribution of the evaluated participant to the alliance. In addition, for each participant, both the optimistic and the pessimistic modified Shapley values are considered, and thus the upper and lower bounds of the allocation revenue are obtained, correspondingly. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the operation procedure. Finally, we apply the approach to an empirical application concerning a city commercial bank with 18 branches in China.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。