Shapley-Scarf住房市场：尊重改善，可持续规划和肾脏交换
Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
摘要：
在Shapley和Scarf的住房市场中，每个代理人被赋予一个不可分割的对象，并对所有对象具有偏好。如果不存在（弱）阻塞联盟，则对象的分配在（强）核心中。在本文中，我们表明，在严格的偏好的情况下，唯一的强核心分配（或竞争性分配）方面的改进：如果代理的对象变得更有吸引力的一些其他代理，那么代理的分配在唯一的强核心分配弱改善。我们得到一个一般的结果，在偏好的关系的情况下，并提供新的整数规划公式计算（强）核心和竞争力的分配。最后，我们进行了计算机模拟，比较博弈理论的解决方案与最大规模和最大重量的市场，类似于肾脏交换计划的池交换。
英文摘要：
In a housing market of Shapley and Scarf, each agent is endowed with one indivisible object and has preferences over all objects. An allocation of the objects is in the (strong) core if there exists no (weakly) blocking coalition. In this paper we show that in the case of strict preferences the unique strong core allocation (or competitive allocation) respects improvement: if an agent's object becomes more attractive for some other agents, then the agent's allotment in the unique strong core allocation weakly improves. We obtain a general result in case of ties in the preferences and provide new integer programming formulations for computing (strong) core and competitive allocations. Finally, we conduct computer simulations to compare the game-theoretical solutions with maximum size and maximum weight exchanges for markets that resemble the pools of kidney exchange programmes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
