arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1407.7375quant-ph
收藏

基于Bell不等式的与测量设备无关的量子密钥分发

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution based on Bell's inequality

Hua-Lei Yin, Yao Fu, Yan-Lin Tang, Yuan Li, Teng-Yun Chen, Zeng-Bing Chen

摘要:

提出了两个基于Bell不等式的量子密钥分发(QKD)协议,它们可以看作是改进的时间反演E91协议。类似于与测量设备无关的量子密钥分发(MDI-QKD)协议,第一个方案需要假设Alice和Bob完美地表征编码的量子态。然而,我们的第二个协议不需要这个假设,这可以击败更多的已知和未知的源端攻击相比,MDI-QKD。这两个协议在检测方面自然对所有黑客攻击免疫。因此,这两个协议的安全性可以在公平采样假设下,利用测量数据证明Bell不等式的违反。在我们的模拟中,这两个协议的结果表明,超过200公里的长距离量子密钥分发仍然是安全的,与传统的激光器在渐近数据的情况下。我们提出了一种新的估计Bell不等式破坏的方法,该方法也可以应用于量子信息处理的其他领域。

英文摘要:

We propose two quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols based on Bell's inequality, which can be considered as modified time-reversed E91 protocol. Similar to the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol, the first scheme requires the assumption that Alice and Bob perfectly characterize the encoded quantum states. However, our second protocol does not require this assumption, which can defeat more known and unknown source-side attacks compared with the MDI-QKD. The two protocols are naturally immune to all hacking attacks with respect to detections. Therefore, the security of the two protocols can be proven based on the violation of Bell's inequality with measurement data under fair-sampling assumption. In our simulation, the results of both protocols show that long-distance quantum key distribution over 200 km remains secure with conventional lasers in the asymptotic-data case. We present a new technique to estimate the Bell's inequality violation, which can also be applied to other fields of quantum information processing.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑