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arXiv 1405.6912cs.CR
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非协作攻击者以及如何以及在何处防御有缺陷的安全协议(扩展版)

Non-collaborative Attackers and How and Where to Defend Flawed Security Protocols (Extended Version)

Michele Peroli, Luca Viganò, Matteo Zavatteri

摘要:

安全协议在部署后经常被发现存在缺陷。我们提出了一种方法,旨在中和或缓解的攻击有缺陷的协议:它避免了完全解雇感兴趣的协议,并允许诚实的代理继续使用它,直到一个正确的版本被释放。我们的方法是基于知识的网络拓扑结构,我们的模型作为一个图形,并在随后的可能性创建一个干扰的Dolev-Yao攻击者正在进行的攻击,通过非协作驱动的ad-hoc良性攻击者,发挥网络监护人的作用。这些守护者位于网络的战略点,其任务是监视传输中的消息,并在运行时通过特定类型的推理发现攻击是否正在进行,在肯定的情况下中断协议的运行。我们不仅研究如何,而且在哪里,我们可以尝试捍卫有缺陷的安全协议:我们调查不同的网络拓扑结构,使安全协议防御可行,并说明我们的方法通过具体的例子。

英文摘要:

Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and allows honest agents to continue to use it until a corrected version is released. Our approach is based on the knowledge of the network topology, which we model as a graph, and on the consequent possibility of creating an interference to an ongoing attack of a Dolev-Yao attacker, by means of non-collaboration actuated by ad-hoc benign attackers that play the role of network guardians. Such guardians, positioned in strategical points of the network, have the task of monitoring the messages in transit and discovering at runtime, through particular types of inference, whether an attack is ongoing, interrupting the run of the protocol in the positive case. We study not only how but also where we can attempt to defend flawed security protocols: we investigate the different network topologies that make security protocol defense feasible and illustrate our approach by means of concrete examples.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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