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arXiv 1811.06162cs.CR
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计划拦截游戏

Plan Interdiction Games

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael Pritchard

摘要:

我们提出了一个框架,网络风险评估和缓解模型的攻击者作为正式的规划者和防御者作为拦截这些计划。我们通过使用正式的规划,首先建模网络网络风险,然后正式确定优先漏洞修补计划阻断框架中的一个重要问题,说明了计划阻断问题的价值。特别是,我们表明,选择性地修补相对较少的漏洞允许网络管理员,以显着降低暴露于网络风险。更广泛地说,我们已经开发了一些可扩展的方法计划阻断问题,特别是重大进展时,攻击计划涉及系统动态的不确定性。然而,重要的开放问题仍然存在,包括如何有效地捕捉攻击者和防御者之间的信息不对称,如何最好地建模动态的攻击者-防御者的互动,以及如何开发可扩展的算法来解决相关的计划阻断游戏。

英文摘要:

We propose a framework for cyber risk assessment and mitigation which models attackers as formal planners and defenders as interdicting such plans. We illustrate the value of plan interdiction problems by first modeling network cyber risk through the use of formal planning, and subsequently formalizing an important question of prioritizing vulnerabilities for patching in the plan interdiction framework. In particular, we show that selectively patching relatively few vulnerabilities allows a network administrator to significantly reduce exposure to cyber risk. More broadly, we have developed a number of scalable approaches for plan interdiction problems, making especially significant advances when attack plans involve uncertainty about system dynamics. However, important open problems remain, including how to effectively capture information asymmetry between the attacker and defender, how to best model dynamics in the attacker-defender interaction, and how to develop scalable algorithms for solving associated plan interdiction games.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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