Chi-MERA：利用MLAT的空间特性保护低地球轨道卫星的基于轨道的认证（长版本）
Chi-MERA: Defending Orbit-Based Authentication of LEO Satellites with the Space Oddity of MLAT (Long Version)
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究低地球轨道卫星认证方案易受多设备攻击者攻击问题，提出Chi-MERA方案，利用多边定位和新弹性签名方案，经实验和模拟验证，该方案能有效提高认证性能，防御呈线性扩展，降低误报率和误拒率。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
物理层安全是一个活跃的研究领域，它可以作为不安全遗留系统的最后手段、资源高效的替代方案或加密技术的补充备份。本文表明，先前建立的低地球轨道卫星认证方案容易受到控制多个设备的攻击者的攻击。在广泛的实验中，此类攻击者产生的误报率（FPR）高达40%。基于根本原因分析，我们开发了一种名为Chi-MERA的新方案，该方案提高了认证性能，并且对多设备攻击者具有鲁棒性。我们的方案使用了两项增强功能：（1）多边定位（MLAT）以清楚地区分攻击者和合法卫星；（2）一种新的弹性签名方案，不依赖于单个专用参考接收器。我们的评估表明，利用MLAT特性（如残差分析）对截然不同的信号源类别（轨道与非轨道）进行分类非常有效。在广泛的模拟中，我们表明新的认证实现了<2%的低FPR和<3%的误报率（意外拒绝有效信号）。此外，我们方案的防御呈线性扩展：n个接收器能够可靠地抵御来自拥有n/2个设备的攻击者的欺骗（FPR<1%）。
英文摘要
An active research area, physical layer security can be a last resort in insecure legacy systems, a resource-efficient alternative, or a complementary backup for cryptographic techniques. In this paper, we demonstrate that previously established authentication schemes for LEO satellites are vulnerable to attackers that control multiple devices. In extensive experiments, such attackers produce false positive rates (FPR) of up to 40%. Based on a root cause analysis, we develop a novel scheme, called Chi-MERA, that improves authentication performance and is robust against multi-device attackers. Our scheme uses two enhancements: (1) multilateration (MLAT) to clearly distinguish between attackers and legitimate satellites, and (2), a new resilient signature scheme without dependency on a single dedicated reference receiver. Our evaluation shows that exploiting MLAT characteristics such as residual analysis to classify vastly different signal source categories (orbit vs. non-orbit) is highly effective. In extensive simulations, we show that the new authentication achieves low FPR of $<$2% and false negative rates of $<$3% for accidentally rejecting valid signals. Furthermore, our scheme's defense scales linearly: $n$ receivers reliably withstand spoofing (FPR $< 1%$) from attackers with $\frac{n}{2}$ devices.
