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arXiv 1404.6103cs.GT
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随机分配对策的近似“一价定律”

An Approximate "Law of One Price" in Random Assignment Games

Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm

摘要:

分配博弈代表了一个易于处理但又通用的双边市场转移模型。我们研究了随机生成的分配游戏的核心可能的属性。如果每个企业和工人的联合生产率是独立同分布有界随机变量,那么所有工人的工资很可能大致相同,所有企业的利润也大致相同。这意味着,在平衡的市场中,核心配置差异很大,但即使在稍微不平衡的市场中,也会出现核心趋同。对于均匀分布的基准情况,我们提供了一个紧边界下的企业最优核心配置的工人的剩余份额。我们目前的模拟结果表明,分析的现象出现,即使在中型市场。最后,我们简要讨论了无界分布的影响,以及它们可能影响工资离散的方式。

英文摘要:

Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are i.i.d bounded random variables, then with high probability all workers are paid roughly equal wages, and all firms make similar profits. This implies that core allocations vary significantly in balanced markets, but that there is core convergence in even slightly unbalanced markets. For the benchmark case of uniform distribution, we provide a tight bound for the workers' share of the surplus under the firm-optimal core allocation. We present simulation results suggesting that the phenomena analyzed appear even in medium-sized markets. Finally, we briefly discuss the effects of unbounded distributions and the ways in which they may affect wage dispersion.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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