This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the "objective preparations view" or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes...
Marchildon's (favorable) assessment (quant-ph/0303170, to appear in Found. Phys.) of the Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics raises several issues, which are addressed. Proceeding from the assumption that quantum mechanics is fundamentally a probability algorithm, this interpretation determines the nature of a world that is irreducibly described by this probability algorithm. Such a world features an objective fuzziness, which implies that its spatiotemporal differentiation does not "go all the way down". This result is inconsistent with the existence of an evolving instantaneous s…
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. They compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications - the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world - which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified object…
An overview of the Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics is presented. This interpretation proceeds from the recognition that the fundamental theoretical framework of physics is a probability algorithm, which serves to describe an objective fuzziness (the literal meaning of Heisenberg's term "Unschaerfe," usually mistranslated as "uncertainty") by assigning objective probabilities to the possible outcomes of unperformed measurements. Although it rejects attempts to construe quantum states as evolving ontological states, it arrives at an objective description of the quantum world that…
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only ar…
The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics, and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probab…
Algorithmic probability has shown some promise in dealing with the probability problem in the Everett interpretation, since it provides an objective, single-case probability measure. Many find the Everettian cosmology to be overly extravagant, however, and algorithmic probability has also provided improved models of subjective probability and Bayesian reasoning. I attempt here to generalize algorithmic Everettianism to more Bayesian and subjectivist interpretations. I present a general framework for applying generative probability, of which algorithmic probability can be considered a special c…
How can probabilities make sense in a deterministic many-worlds theory? We address two facets of this problem: why should rational agents assign subjective probabilities to branching events, and why should branching events happen with relative frequencies matching their objective probabilities. To address the first question, we generalise the Deutsch-Wallace theorem to a wide class of many-world theories, and show that the subjective probabilities are given by a norm that depends on the dynamics of the theory: the 2-norm in the usual Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the 1-n…
Resource-efficient quantum approximate optimization algorithm via Bayesian optimization and maximum-probability evaluation
National Key Laboratory of Autonomous Intelligent Unmanned Systems, Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems, Tongji University（同济大学智能无人系统全国重点实验室、上海智能无人驾驶系统研究所）；College of Electronic and Information Engineering, Tongji University（同济大学电子与信息工程学院）
We propose a new interpretation of objective deterministic chances in statistical physics based on physical computational complexity. This notion applies to a single physical system (be it an experimental set--up in the lab, or a subsystem of the universe), and quantifies (1) the difficulty to realize a physical state given another, (2) the `distance' (in terms of physical resources) of a physical state from another, and (3) the size of the set of time--complexity functions that are compatible with the physical resources required to reach a physical state from another. This view (a) exorcises …
The violation of Bell inequalities is often interpreted as showing that, if hidden variables exist, they must be contextual and non local. But they can also be explained questioning the probability space employed, or the validity of the Kolmogorov axioms. In this article we explore the additional constrains which can be deduced from two widely used objetive probability theories: frequentism and propensities. One of the strongest objections in the deduction of one version of Bell inequalities goes about the probability space, which assumes the existence of values for the output of the experimen…
Objective probability in quantum mechanics is often thought to involve a stochastic process whereby an actual future is selected from a range of possibilities. Everett's seminal idea is that all possible definite futures on the pointer basis exist as components of a macroscopic linear superposition. I demonstrate that these two conceptions of what is involved in quantum processes are linked by two alternative interpretation of the mind-body relation. This leads to a fission, rather than divergence, interpretation of Everettian theory and to a novel explanation of why a principle of indifferenc…
We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective. Our results are in accord with earlier work by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, but our approach and emphasis are different. We also discuss the problem of choosing a noninformative prior for a density matrix.
The Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm (QAOA) is a standard method for combinatorial optimization with a gate-based quantum computer. The QAOA consists of a particular ansatz for the quantum circuit architecture, together with a prescription for choosing the variational parameters of the circuit. We propose modifications to both. First, we define the Gibbs objective function and show that it is superior to the energy expectation value for use as an objective function in tuning the variational parameters. Second, we describe an Ansatz Architecture Search (AAS) algorithm for searching th…
Maintaining the position that the wave function $ψ$ provides a complete description of state, the traditional formalism of quantum mechanics is augmented by introducing continuous trajectories for particles which are sample paths of a stochastic process determined (including the underlying probability space) by $ψ$. In the resulting formalism, problems relating to measurements and objective reality are solved as in Bohmian mechanics (without sharing its weak points). The pitfalls of Nelson's stochastic mechanics are also avoided.
Quantum "states" are objective probability measures. Because their dependence on a time is not the time dependence of an evolving state, they are neither states of Nature nor "states of knowledge." There is no such thing as an evolving state. This disposes of the problem posed by the apparent existence of two modes of evolution. What essentially stands in the way of a consistent ontological interpretation of the quantum theory is our habit of projecting into the quantum world the detached, intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal background of classical physics, for this is what entails the…
The usual interpretational rule of quantum mechanics which states that outcomes do not occur when their weights are zero is changed so as to preclude outcomes with weights less than a small but positive value. With this "positive preclusion" rule, and in the absence of any notion of objective probability, Everett quantum mechanics has the explanatory power to account for the evolution of organisms with subjective expectations of probability that are in accord with the Born rule. Positive preclusion also allows for the derivation of a connection between weight and relative frequency in situatio…
The question whether quantum measurements reflect some underlying objective reality has no generally accepted answer. We show that description of such reality is possible under natural conditions such as linearity and causality, although in terms of moments and cumulants of finite order and without relativistic invariance. The proposed construction of observations' probability distribution originates from weak, noninvasive measurements, with detection error replaced by some external finite noise. The noise allows to construct microscopic objective reality, but remains dynamically decoupled and…
I give a brief introduction to many worlds or "no wavefunction collapse" quantum mechanics, suitable for non-specialists. I then discuss the origin of probability in such formulations, distinguishing between objective and subjective notions of probability.
In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of "strange" quantum particles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread "way of speaking" in the physics community, contradicts Born's physical account of Ψ as a "probability wave" which provides statistical information about outcomes that, in fact, cannot be interp…
This paper is a sequel to the series of papers [gr-qc/9409010, gr-qc/9505034, gr-qc/9603022, gr-qc/9609035, gr-qc/9609046, gr-qc/9704033, gr-qc/9704038, gr-qc/9708014, gr-qc/9802016]. The problem of the meaning of objective a priori probability for individual random trials without repetition is considered. A sequence of such trials, namely quantum jumps, is realized in indeterministic dynamics of the universe. A hidden selector for the quantum jumps is constructed.
Realist, no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, such as Everett's, face the probability problem: how to justify the norm-squared (Born) rule from the wavefunction alone. While any basis-independent measure can only be norm-squared (due to the Gleason-Busch Theorem) this fact conflicts with various popular, non-wavefunction-based phenomenological measures - such as observer, outcome or world counting - that are frequently demanded of Everettians. These alternatives conflict, however, with the wavefunction realism upon which Everett's approach rests, which seems to call for an objecti…
We establish connections between the requirement of measurability of a probability space and the principle of complimentarity in quantum mechanics. It is shown that measurability of a probability space implies the dependence of results of quantum measurement not only on the properties of a quantum object under consideration, but also on the classical characteristics of the measuring device which is used. We show that if one takes into account the requirement of measurability in a quantum case, the Bell inequality does not follow from the hypothesis about the existence of an objective reality.
