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arXiv quant-ph/0409125quant-phcs.CR
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量子协议的可模拟安全性

Simulatable security for quantum protocols

Dominique Unruh

摘要:

可模拟安全性(反应式可模拟性、通用可组合性)的概念是一个强大的工具,它允许密码协议的模块化设计(协议的组合),并显示嵌入在更大协议中的给定协议的安全性。近年来,这些方法在量子密码学界受到了广泛的关注。我们给一个简短的介绍,一般的模拟安全,并通过勾勒出许多不同的定义选择,连同他们的优点和缺点。基于Backes,Pfitzmann和Waidner的反应模拟性建模,我们开发了一个量子安全模型。通过尽可能紧密地遵循BPW建模,我们表明,量子协议的可组合量子安全定义可以从其经典对应物中获益,因为建模中的大多数定义选择都独立于底层机器模型。特别地,我们给出了一个证明的简单组成定理在我们的框架。

英文摘要:

The notion of simulatable security (reactive simulatability, universal composability) is a powerful tool for allowing the modular design of cryptographic protocols (composition of protocols) and showing the security of a given protocol embedded in a larger one. Recently, these methods have received much attention in the quantum cryptographic community. We give a short introduction to simulatable security in general and proceed by sketching the many different definitional choices together with their advantages and disadvantages. Based on the reactive simulatability modelling of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner we then develop a quantum security model. By following the BPW modelling as closely as possible, we show that composable quantum security definitions for quantum protocols can strongly profit from their classical counterparts, since most of the definitional choices in the modelling are independent of the underlying machine model. In particular, we give a proof for the simple composition theorem in our framework.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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