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arXiv 0902.3918quant-ph
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利用Commit-and-Open提高量子协议的安全性

Improving the Security of Quantum Protocols via Commit-and-Open

Ivan Damgaard, Serge Fehr, Carolin Lunemann, Louis Salvail, Christian Schaffner

摘要:

我们考虑两方量子协议,首先传输一些随机BB84量子比特,然后是经典消息。我们展示了一个通用的“编译器”,提高了此类协议的安全性:如果原始协议对“几乎诚实”的对手是安全的,那么编译后的协议对任意计算有界(量子)对手是安全的。编译保留了发送的量子位数和舍入数,直到一个常数因子。编译器还在有界量子存储模型(BQSM)中保持安全性,因此如果原始协议是BQSM安全的,则编译后的协议只能被具有大量子存储器和大计算能力的对手破坏。这与已知的BQSM安全协议相反,如果对手具有比预期更大的量子存储器,则安全性完全崩溃。我们展示了我们的技术可以应用于量子识别和不经意传输协议。

英文摘要:

We consider two-party quantum protocols starting with a transmission of some random BB84 qubits followed by classical messages. We show a general "compiler" improving the security of such protocols: if the original protocol is secure against an "almost honest" adversary, then the compiled protocol is secure against an arbitrary computationally bounded (quantum) adversary. The compilation preserves the number of qubits sent and the number of rounds up to a constant factor. The compiler also preserves security in the bounded-quantum-storage model (BQSM), so if the original protocol was BQSM-secure, the compiled protocol can only be broken by an adversary who has large quantum memory and large computing power. This is in contrast to known BQSM-secure protocols, where security breaks down completely if the adversary has larger quantum memory than expected. We show how our technique can be applied to quantum identification and oblivious transfer protocols.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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