通过反向量子通信确保量子比特承诺
Securing quantum bit commitment through reverse quantum communication
摘要：
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-（EPR）和更强大的Mayers-Lo-Chau攻击对量子比特承诺（QBC）施加了严重的限制。作为规避它们的一种方法，提出了对提交者（Alice）选择的承诺进行编码的量子系统应该最初在接受者（Bob）而不是Alice已知并提供的可分离的量子态中准备。经典通信用于结束承诺阶段并绑定Alice的后续揭幕。这类安全协议可以建立在目前提出的QBC方案不受简单EPR攻击的基础上。作为一个例子，这里给出了一个具体的方案的基础上的Escherard-Crepeau-Josza-Langlois协议。
英文摘要：
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen- (EPR) and the more powerful Mayers-Lo-Chau attack impose a serious constraint on quantum bit commitment (QBC). As a way to circumvent them, it is proposed that the quantum system encoding the commitment chosen by the committer (Alice) should be initially prepared in a seperable quantum state known to and furnished by the acceptor (Bob), rather than Alice. Classical communication is used to conclude the commitment phase and bind Alice's subsequent unveiling. Such a class of secure protocols can be built upon currently proposed QBC schemes impervious to a simple EPR attack. A specific scheme based on the Brassard-Crepeau-Josza-Langlois protocol is presented here as an example.
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