量子计算机功率侧信道探索
Exploration of Quantum Computer Power Side-Channels
AI总结：
本研究首次证明功率侧信道攻击可针对量子计算机，通过分析控制脉冲逆向工程电路与算法，提出五种攻击并给出防御方法。
摘要：
随着对量子计算兴趣的迅速增长，保护这些量子计算机免受各种物理攻击的重要性也随之增加。量子比特数量的不断增加以及量子计算机保真度的持续改进，为这些计算机运行包含高度敏感知识产权的新算法带来了巨大希望。然而，在当今基于云的量子计算机环境中，用户对这些计算机缺乏物理控制。物理攻击，例如由数据中心内部的恶意人员实施的攻击，可能被用来提取关于在这些计算机上执行的电路敏感信息。确实，这项工作首次表明，基于功率的侧信道攻击可以针对量子计算机部署。此类攻击可用于恢复发送到这些计算机的控制脉冲信息。通过分析这些控制脉冲，攻击者可以逆向工程出电路的等效门级描述，甚至可能逆向工程出正在运行的秘密算法。这项工作引入了五种新型攻击，并使用从基于云的量子计算机可获取的控制脉冲信息对其进行了评估。这项工作演示了如何以及哪些电路可能被恢复，进而演示了如何防御新展示的针对量子计算机的侧信道攻击。
英文摘要：
With the rapidly growing interest in quantum computing also grows the importance of securing these quantum computers from various physical attacks. Constantly increasing qubit counts and improvements to the fidelity of the quantum computers hold great promise for the ability of these computers to run novel algorithms with highly sensitive intellectual property. However, in today's cloud-based quantum computer setting, users lack physical control over the computers. Physical attacks, such as those perpetrated by malicious insiders in data centers, could be used to extract sensitive information about the circuits being executed on these computers. Indeed, this work shows for the first time that power-based side-channel attacks could be deployed against quantum computers. Such attacks can be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to these computers. By analyzing these control pulses, attackers can reverse-engineer the equivalent gate-level description of the circuits, and possibly even the secret algorithms being run. This work introduces five new types of attacks, and evaluates them using control pulse information available from cloud-based quantum computers. This work demonstrates how and what circuits could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from the newly demonstrated side-channel attacks on quantum~computers.
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