AI 中文总结
该研究针对容错量子计算机，识别出利用解码器系统边信道攻击的新类型。引入门指纹概念，通过Clifford+T计算展示其产生方式，探讨利用门指纹信息推断计算，发现解码器系统易遭攻击，建议由可信方构建或保护。
AI 中文摘要
随着量子计算成为一种应用技术，保护量子计算机免受信息安全攻击的需求日益增长。这项工作识别出一类针对容错量子计算机的新型边信道攻击，攻击者利用发送到解码器系统的校正子数据推断量子计算机上正在进行的计算（逻辑电路）。我们的工作引入了门指纹的概念，它描述了校正子数据中指示量子计算机上发生了哪种逻辑操作的模式。通过关注表面码中的Clifford+T计算，我们展示了逻辑操作产生门指纹的不同方式。然后，我们探讨了如何利用门指纹信息推断量子计算机上运行的电路或算法。我们的发现表明，解码器系统可能成为边信道攻击的载体，因此为防止这种情况，解码器系统应由可信方构建或进行安全保护。
英文摘要
As quantum computing emerges as an applied technology, there is a growing need to protect quantum computers against information security attacks. This work identifies a new class of side-channel attacks against fault-tolerant quantum computers, in which the syndrome data that is sent to the decoder system is used to infer which computation (logical circuit) is taking place on the quantum computer. Our work introduces the concept of gate fingerprints, which describes those patterns present in syndrome data that indicate which logical operation took place on the quantum computer. We show different effects by which logical operations produce gate fingerprints by focusing on Clifford+T computation in the surface code. We then explore how gate fingerprint information can be used to make inferences about the circuits or algorithms run on a quantum computer. Our findings indicate that decoder systems can be a vector for side-channel attacks and thus to prevent this, decoder systems should either be secured or built by a trusted party.
Comments10 pages, 10 figures. Comments are welcome
