The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic leaks and sound can be exploited by the side-channel attack to compromise the system. Much research effort has been directed towards this field. However, such an attack still requires strong skills, thus can only be performed effectively by experts. Here, we propose SCNet, which automatically performs side-channel attacks. And we also design this network combining with side-channel domain knowledge and different deep learning model to improve the performance and better to explain the result. The results show that our model achieves good performance with fewer parameters. The proposed model is a useful tool for automatically testing the robustness of computer systems.
电磁(EM)侧信道分析(SCA)是一种重要的工具,可以破解安全的加密引擎,特别是在资源受限的物联网设备上。目前,为了在嵌入式IoT设备上执行EM SCA,整个芯片被手动扫描,并且在芯片上的每个点处执行MTD(最小泄露痕迹)分析,以揭示加密算法的秘密密钥。然而,用于EM泄漏定位、跟踪采集和攻击的自动化端到端框架一直缺失。这项工作提出了SCNIFFER:一个低成本的,自动化的EM侧通道泄漏嗅探平台,以执行有效的端到端的侧信道攻击。使用泄漏测量,如TVLA或SNR,我们提出了一种贪婪的梯度搜索启发式算法,该算法在O(N)次迭代内收敛到芯片上最高EM泄漏点之一(维度:N x N),然后在该点执行相关EM分析(CEMA)。与穷举MTD分析相比,这将CEMA攻击时间减少了~N倍,与随机选择攻击位置相比,减少了> 20倍。我们演示了SCNIFFER使用低成本定制的3-D扫描仪与H场探头(< $500) compared to >$ 50,000商业EM扫描仪,和各种微控制器作为受攻击的设备。SCNIFFER框架针对在8位Atmega微控制器和32位ARM微控制器上运行的几种加密算法(AES-128、DES、RSA)进行评估,以找到高泄漏点,然后在该点执行CEMA。
Automated Template-free Synthesis of Instruction-Centric Leakage Contracts for Black-Box CPUs
IMDEA Software Institute(IMDEA软件研究所);Universidad Politécnica de Madrid(马德里理工大学);CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security(CISPA亥姆霍兹信息安全中心);Saarland University(萨尔兰大学);Northeastern University(东北大学);University of Trento(特伦托大学);KTH Royal Institute of Technology(瑞典皇家理工学院)
Rosita++: Automatic Higher-Order Leakage Elimination from Cryptographic Code
侧信道攻击是对加密实现的安全性的主要威胁,特别是对于在对手的物理控制下的小型设备。虽然存在几种防止侧信道攻击的策略,但由于CPU内部深层值之间的意外交互,这些策略在实践中通常会失败。为了检测和防止侧信道攻击,最近提出了几种自动化工具;它们的共同限制之一是它们仅支持一阶泄漏。在这项工作中,我们提出了第一个自动化的工具,用于检测和消除高阶泄漏的加密实现。Rosita++提出了基于统计和软件的工具,以实现高性能的高阶泄漏检测。然后,它使用Rosita的代码重写引擎(Shelton et al. NDSS 2021)来消除检测到的泄漏。为了实用起见,我们评估Rosita++对二阶和三阶泄漏,但我们的框架不仅限于这些订单。我们评估了Rosita++对二阶泄漏的影响,包括两个密码的三个共享实现,PRESENT和Xoodoo,以及二阶布尔到算术掩码,这是许多加密原语(包括SHA-2,ChaCha和Blake)的掩码实现的核心构建块。我们展示了有效的二阶泄漏消除,Xoodoo的性能成本为36%,PRESENT为189%,布尔到算术掩码为29%。对于三阶分析,我们使用对应于典型四共享处理的四共享合成示例来评估Rosita++对三阶泄漏的影响。Rosita++正确地识别了此泄漏并应用了代码修复。
ViSTR-GP: Online Cyberattack Detection via Vision-to-State Tensor Regression and Gaussian Processes in Automated Robotic Operations
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Washington(工业与系统工程系,华盛顿大学);Department of Automotive Engineering, Clemson University(汽车工程系,克莱姆斯大学);School of Computing, Clemson University(计算学院,克莱姆斯大学)