通过安全感知的即时编译防止定时边信道
Preventing Timing Side-Channels via Security-Aware Just-In-Time Compilation
摘要:
最近的工作表明,即时(JIT)编译可以引入定时侧通道的恒定时间的程序,这将是一个原则和有效的手段来对抗定时攻击。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的方法来消除JIT引起的泄漏从这些程序。具体地说,我们提出了一个操作语义和形式化定义下的JIT编译的恒定时间程序,奠定了基础的推理程序与JIT编译。然后,我们建议通过细粒度的JIT编译,我们提供了一个自动化的方法来生成策略和一个新的类型系统,以显示其健全性,以消除JIT引起的泄漏。在此基础上,我们开发了一个面向Java的编译工具DeJITLeak,并在HotSpot中实现了细粒度的JIT编译。实验结果表明,DeJITLeak算法能够有效地消除JIT引起的泄漏
英文摘要:
Recent work has shown that Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation can introduce timing side-channels to constant-time programs, which would otherwise be a principled and effective means to counter timing attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to eliminate JIT-induced leaks from these programs. Specifically, we present an operational semantics and a formal definition of constant-time programs under JIT compilation, laying the foundation for reasoning about programs with JIT compilation. We then propose to eliminate JIT-induced leaks via a fine-grained JIT compilation for which we provide an automated approach to generate policies and a novel type system to show its soundness. We develop a tool DeJITLeak for Java based on our approach and implement the fine-grained JIT compilation in HotSpot. Experimental results show that DeJITLeak can effectively and efficiently eliminate JIT-induced leaks on three datasets used in side-channel detection
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