arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2303.09731cs.CRcs.AI
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驱除“幽灵”:保护自动驾驶系统中的LiDAR-based物体探测器免受攻击

Exorcising ''Wraith'': Protecting LiDAR-based Object Detector in Automated Driving System from Appearing Attacks

Fudan University(复旦大学)

Qifan Xiao, Xudong Pan, Yifan Lu, Mi Zhang, Jiarun Dai, Min Yang

摘要:

自动驾驶系统依靠3D物体探测器从LiDAR点云中识别可能的障碍物。然而,最近的研究表明,对手可以用一些假点(即,出现攻击)。然而,通过去除统计异常值,现有的防御是针对特定攻击而设计的,或者受到预定义的启发式规则的影响。为了更全面的缓解,我们首先系统地检查最近出现的攻击的机制:它们的共同弱点是在制作假障碍物时观察到的,这些假障碍物(i)与真实障碍物相比在局部部分具有明显的差异,(ii)违反深度和点密度之间的物理关系。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的即插即用防御模块,该模块与经过训练的基于LiDAR的物体检测器一起工作,以消除伪造的障碍物,其中大部分局部部件具有低对象性,即,它在多大程度上属于真实物体。在我们的模块的核心是一个局部对象预测器,它显式地结合了深度信息来模拟深度和点密度之间的关系,并预测每个局部部分的障碍物的对象得分。大量的实验表明,我们提出的防御措施,消除了至少70%的汽车伪造的三个已知出现的攻击在大多数情况下,而以前的最好的防御,不到30%的伪造汽车被淘汰。同时,在相同的情况下,与现有的防御相比,我们的防御在汽车上产生的AP/精度开销更少。在百度Apollo开源系统上进行了基于仿真的闭环控制路测,验证了本文提出的防御方法的有效性。

英文摘要:

Automated driving systems rely on 3D object detectors to recognize possible obstacles from LiDAR point clouds. However, recent works show the adversary can forge non-existent cars in the prediction results with a few fake points (i.e., appearing attack). By removing statistical outliers, existing defenses are however designed for specific attacks or biased by predefined heuristic rules. Towards more comprehensive mitigation, we first systematically inspect the mechanism of recent appearing attacks: Their common weaknesses are observed in crafting fake obstacles which (i) have obvious differences in the local parts compared with real obstacles and (ii) violate the physical relation between depth and point density. In this paper, we propose a novel plug-and-play defensive module which works by side of a trained LiDAR-based object detector to eliminate forged obstacles where a major proportion of local parts have low objectness, i.e., to what degree it belongs to a real object. At the core of our module is a local objectness predictor, which explicitly incorporates the depth information to model the relation between depth and point density, and predicts each local part of an obstacle with an objectness score. Extensive experiments show, our proposed defense eliminates at least 70% cars forged by three known appearing attacks in most cases, while, for the best previous defense, less than 30% forged cars are eliminated. Meanwhile, under the same circumstance, our defense incurs less overhead for AP/precision on cars compared with existing defenses. Furthermore, We validate the effectiveness of our proposed defense on simulation-based closed-loop control driving tests in the open-source system of Baidu's Apollo.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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