针对量子计算机控制器的功率侧信道攻击下的量子电路重构
Quantum Circuit Reconstruction from Power Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computer Controllers
AI总结:
本文针对量子电路面临的功率侧信道攻击威胁,提出基于代数重构的两类单轨迹攻击方法,经32个真实基准电路验证可高精度重构量子电路,凸显了量子电路功率防护的必要性。
摘要:
近年来,人们对量子计算的兴趣迅速增长,量子电路的安全性也随之变得愈发重要。专门的攻击者可能对量子电路发起的一类新型威胁是功率轨迹攻击。为应对这一威胁,本文首次对利用功率轨迹窃取量子电路机密的方法进行了形式化定义与演示。通过获取功率轨迹,攻击者能够恢复发送至量子计算机的控制脉冲相关信息。从控制脉冲出发,可逆向推导出电路的门级描述,最终获取机密算法。本研究演示了可恢复的信息类型以及恢复方式。本研究利用基于功率轨迹的代数重构技术,实现了两类新型单轨迹攻击:分通道攻击与总功率攻击。前者依靠分通道测量实施暴力破解攻击以重构量子电路;后者则利用混合整数线性规划优化执行单轨迹攻击。通过代数重构技术,本研究证明量子电路机密可被高精度窃取。对32个真实基准量子电路的评估结果表明,我们的技术在重构量子电路方面具有极高的有效性。这些发现不仅证实了潜在攻击的真实性,也凸显了开发新型防护手段以保护量子电路免受功率轨迹攻击的必要性。在整个研究过程中,我们使用来自真实量子计算机的真实控制脉冲信息,通过模拟功率轨迹采集过程来演示潜在攻击。
英文摘要:
The interest in quantum computing has grown rapidly in recent years, and with it grows the importance of securing quantum circuits. A novel type of threat to quantum circuits that dedicated attackers could launch are power trace attacks. To address this threat, this paper presents first formalization and demonstration of using power traces to unlock and steal quantum circuit secrets. With access to power traces, attackers can recover information about the control pulses sent to quantum computers. From the control pulses, the gate level description of the circuits, and eventually the secret algorithms can be reverse engineered. This work demonstrates how and what information could be recovered. This work uses algebraic reconstruction from power traces to realize two new types of single trace attacks: per-channel and total power attacks. The former attack relies on per-channel measurements to perform a brute-force attack to reconstruct the quantum circuits. The latter attack performs a single-trace attack using Mixed-Integer Linear Programming optimization. Through the use of algebraic reconstruction, this work demonstrates that quantum circuit secrets can be stolen with high accuracy. Evaluation on 32 real benchmark quantum circuits shows that our technique is highly effective at reconstructing quantum circuits. The findings not only show the veracity of the potential attacks, but also the need to develop new means to protect quantum circuits from power trace attacks. Throughout this work real control pulse information from real quantum computers is used to demonstrate potential attacks based on simulation of collection of power traces.
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