负电容晶体管（NCFET）的功率侧信道攻击
Power Side-Channel Attacks in Negative Capacitance Transistor (NCFET)
摘要：
侧信道攻击使得能够绕过电路中的加密组件。电力侧信道（PSC）攻击由于其非侵入性和经验证的有效性而受到特别的关注。除了专注于常规技术的现有技术之外，这是在PSC攻击的背景下研究新兴的负电容晶体管（NCFET）技术的第一项工作。我们实现了一个CAD流程PSC评估在设计时。它利用了行业标准的设计工具，同时还采用了广泛接受的相关功率分析（CPA）攻击。使用基于7nm FinFET技术的标准单元库NCFET及其对应的CMOS设置，我们的评估表明，基于NCFET的电路更能抵抗经典的CPA攻击，这是由于负电容对开关功率的相当大的影响。我们还证明了铁电层越厚，基于NCFET的电路的弹性就越高，这为优化和权衡打开了新的大门。
英文摘要：
Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their non-invasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art focused on conventional technologies, this is the first work to investigate the emerging Negative Capacitance Transistor (NCFET) technology in the context of PSC attacks. We implement a CAD flow for PSC evaluation at design-time. It leverages industry-standard design tools, while also employing the widely-accepted correlation power analysis (CPA) attack. Using standard-cell libraries based on the 7nm FinFET technology for NCFET and its counterpart CMOS setup, our evaluation reveals that NCFET-based circuits are more resilient to the classical CPA attack, due to the considerable effect of negative capacitance on the switching power. We also demonstrate that the thicker the ferroelectric layer, the higher the resiliency of the NCFET-based circuit, which opens new doors for optimization and trade-offs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
