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arXiv quant-ph/0408058quant-ph
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Probabilities are single-case, or nothing

D. M. Appleby

英文摘要:

Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian conception, in which probabilities are conceived as logical constructs rather than physical realities, and in which probability statements do apply directly to individual events. The question is closely related to the disagreement between the orthodox school of statistical thought and the Bayesian school. It has important technical implications (it makes a difference, what statistical methodology one adopts). It may also have important implications for the interpretation of the quantum state.

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