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概率是否需要单一历史?

Does Probability Require a Single History?

Jonathan Baxter

arXiv 2608.22733首次发表:更新:

AI 中文总结

本文针对埃弗雷特量子力学的概率问题,提出公理化方案,将归一化玻恩测度作为观察者未来延续体记录上的客观概率,辩护该方案并论证其与坍缩定律预测一致。

AI 中文摘要

埃弗雷特量子力学常被认为缺乏连贯的概率,因为所有可能的测量结果都会发生。如果所有结果在全局都存在,概率应该是指什么的概率?本文为一个公理化答案辩护:归一化的玻恩测度被假定为观察者未来延续体所承载记录上的客观概率,坍缩定律为可能的全局结果赋予相同概率,两种理论均未从其本体论中推导出概率。笔者将这一最小方案与早期公理化解释关联,将其与伴随的人格持存理论区分,并为其辩护以应对近期关于公理化路径无法成功的论证。在记录结果的层面,尽管两种理论本体论不同,埃弗雷特定律支持的预测与经验推理和坍缩定律相同。

英文摘要

Everettian quantum mechanics is often said to lack coherent probability because every possible measurement result occurs. If all of them exist globally, what is probability supposed to be a probability of? This paper defends an axiomatic answer: normalized Born measure is postulated as objective probability over the records borne by an observer's future continuations. Collapse interpretations likewise postulate the Born probabilities, but instead assign them to possible global outcomes. Neither theory derives the probabilities from its ontology. The contribution is an explicit record-level probability model that separates probabilities for future local records from certainty about their global existence. I use this model to answer objections to the axiomatic approach and argue that neither global selection nor a further theory of personal persistence is required. At the level of recorded results, the Everettian law supports the same predictions and empirical inferences as the collapse law, despite the theories' different ontologies.

CommentsRevised exposition and expanded responses concerning personal continuation, Born versus counting measure, and empirical confirmation. Probability model unchanged

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