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arXiv 2611.06891cs.DScs.GT
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拟阵与XOS估值的先知秘书问题:1-1/e处的严格分离

Prophet Secretary for Matroids and XOS Valuations: A Separation at 1-1/e and a 0.6767 Guarantee for I.I.D. Weights

Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi

AI总结:

该研究证明拟阵先知秘书问题可实现优于1-1/e的竞争比,而XOS估值的组合拍卖问题的最优竞争比为1-1/e,揭示了两类问题的严格分离。

摘要:

拟阵先知秘书问题要求在线算法选择一个独立集,其非负元素值独立抽取并以均匀随机顺序揭示。其组合拍卖对应问题要求算法为到达的买家分配不相交的束,买家具有独立抽取的XOS估值函数。在这两个问题中,分布是已知的,基准是离线最优期望。Ehsani、Hajiaghayi、Kesselheim和Singla(SODA 2018)为这两种场景提供了(1-1/e)竞争比的算法。在本研究中,我们表明这两种保证具有不同的极限。对于每个拟阵,我们提供一种随机(1-1/e+ε₀)竞争比的算法,其中ε₀=10⁻⁶。该保证适用于具有有限期望最优的独立非负值。对于具有有理数值和概率的显式给定有限分布,该算法在拟阵独立查询模型中具有多项式最坏情况运行时间。该查询测试查询集是否独立。该算法平均进行O(N⁴)次此类查询,最坏情况下进行O(N⁴log(N+2))次,其中N是元素数量。然而,对于具有XOS估值的组合拍卖,我们表明1-1/e是最优竞争比。我们提供一个显式的有限实例族,表明没有在线算法能保证比1-1/e更大的竞争比,即使买家的估值独立同分布、每个加性子句的系数在{0,1}中且计算不受限制。因此,拟阵的改进利用了XOS估值的一般分配中不存在的结构。

英文摘要:

Ehsani, Hajiaghayi, Kesselheim, and Singla (SODA 2018) give $(1-1/e)$-competitive algorithms for matroid prophet-secretary and prophet-secretary with XOS valuation functions. In this work we show that these two guarantees have different limits. For every matroid, we give a randomized $(1-1/e+\varepsilon_0)$-competitive algorithm, where $\varepsilon_0=10^{-6}$. The guarantee holds for independent nonnegative values with finite expected optimum. For explicitly given finite distributions with rational values and probabilities, the algorithm has polynomial worst-case running time in the matroid independence-oracle model. The oracle tests whether a queried set is independent. The algorithm makes $O(N^4)$ such queries in expectation and $O(N^4\log(N+2))$ in the worst case, where $N$ is the number of elements. We further consider the i.i.d. version of this problem and provide a $0.6767$ competitive ratio for every matroid with i.i.d.\ nonnegative weights from a known distribution. This guarantee even holds in fixed arrival order (a.k.a. i.i.d. matriod prophet inequalities), even when the algorithm learns the order only as the elements arrive. For combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations, however, we show that $1-1/e$ is the optimal competitive ratio. We give an explicit family of finite instances showing that no online algorithm can guarantee a larger competitive ratio than $1-1/e$, even when the buyers' valuations are i.i.d., every additive clause has coefficients in $\{0,1\}$, and computation is unrestricted. Thus the matroid improvement exploits structure absent from general allocation with XOS valuations.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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