选举规则在反馈下的几何比较
Geometric Comparisons of Electoral Rules Under Feedback
AI总结:
本文研究了在 voters 和 candidates 适应重复选举结果时,选举规则如何影响极化动态,通过 winner radius 和 supporter centroid radius 两个几何指标分析规则间的对比,发现两者存在张力,不同规则在减少一个指标时往往增加另一个。
摘要:
我们研究了在 voters 和 candidates 都适应重复选举结果时,选举规则如何塑造极化动态。我们引入了两个几何原始元素来比较规则:winner radius $R_t = \max_i \|x_i - w^{(t)}\|$, 即赢家到最远选民的距离,以及 supporter centroid radius $S_t = \max_j \|c_j - s_j^{(t)}\|$, 即任何候选人与其支持基础之间的最大差距。我们证明 $R_t$ 控制了 voter disagreement 的一步收缩界,$S_t$ 在候选人分散方面起类似作用,且两者存在张力。减少 $R_t$ 的规则往往增加 $S_t$,反之亦然。一个接近 voter median 的赢家并不能缓解这种张力,因为中位数接近性和 Chebyshev 中心接近性是不同的目标。我们利用这一框架组织了一项跨七种标准选举规则和一种凸组合基准的模拟研究,涵盖 1000 多次运行,涉及多样化的选民群体、投票机制和阵营平衡设置。实证结果证实了理论上的权衡:赢家通吃规则在 $S_t$ 方面取得小值,但 $R_t$ 大且 voter depolarization 弱,而凸组合规则则相反。进一步的 oracle 比较显示,最小化 $R_t$ 每步和最小化 voter disagreement 每步是不同的目标,对 voter 和 candidate 动态有不同长期影响。
英文摘要:
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t = \max_i \|x_i - w^{(t)}\|$, the distance from the winner to the farthest voter, and the \emph{supporter centroid radius} $S_t = \max_j \|c_j - s_j^{(t)}\|$, the largest gap between any candidate and their support base. We show that $R_t$ controls a one-step contraction bound on voter disagreement and $S_t$ plays the analogous role for candidate dispersion, and that these two objectives are in tension. Rules that reduce $R_t$ tend to increase $S_t$, and vice versa. A winner close to the voter median does not resolve the tension, since proximity to the median and proximity to the Chebyshev center are different objectives. We use this framing to organize a simulation study across seven standard electoral rules and one convex-combination benchmark, comprising 1000+ runs across diverse electorate profiles, voter mechanisms, and camp-balance settings. The empirical results confirm the theoretical tradeoff: winner-take-all rules achieve small $S_t$ at the cost of large $R_t$ and weaker voter depolarization, while convex-combination rules reverse this. An oracle comparison further shows that minimizing $R_t$ per step and minimizing voter disagreement per step are distinct objectives with different long-run consequences for both voter and candidate dynamics.
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