战役管理中的近似算法
Approximation Algorithms for Campaign Management
摘要：
我们研究了竞选活动的管理方案，其中外部政党可以购买选票，即，支付选民在他们的偏好排名中提升其偏好的候选人。外部政党的目标是使其首选的候选人成为赢家，同时尽可能少地支付费用。我们描述了一个2-近似算法为这个问题的一大类的选举系统称为评分规则。我们的结果，甚至加权选民，并在商业环境中的竞选管理的应用程序。我们也给我们的问题的近似算法的两个康多塞一致的规则，即Copeland规则和maximin。
英文摘要：
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a winner while paying as little as possible. We describe a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem for a large class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. Our result holds even for weighted voters, and has applications for campaign management in commercial settings. We also give approximation algorithms for our problem for two Condorcet-consistent rules, namely, the Copeland rule and maximin.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
