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arXiv 2603.03016cs.GT
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单样本双边交易与经纪人

Single-Sample Bilateral Trade with a Broker

University of Maryland College Park(马里兰大学帕克分校)

MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Gary Peng, Suho Shin

AI总结:

本文研究了单样本双边交易中经纪人的影响,提出机制在标准假设下实现对最优交易收益和社会福利的常数因子近似,并与无经纪人的结果形成对比。

摘要:

我们启动了对单样本双边交易与经纪人的研究,借鉴Babaioff等人(2020)和Cai和Wu(2023)中考虑的无经纪人的单样本双边交易设置。我们的模型捕捉了三方互动,其中经纪人在买家和卖家之间促成交易,双方由估值分布描述,可以从其中抽取单个样本。我们特别考虑了两种情况:一种是买家和卖家的估值分布相同,另一种是估值分布随机有序。我们分析了仅依赖每个代理分布中单个样本的简单机制,并显示这些机制在标准单调危险率假设下实现了对最优交易收益(GFT)、最优社会福利(SW)和最优利润的常数因子近似。我们随后用匹配或几乎匹配的上界补充这些结果,针对我们的机制的GFT和SW。值得注意的是,在两种情况下,由于经纪人的存在,我们观察到对最优GFT和最优SW的近似因子损失较小(与无经纪人的设置相比)。此外,我们的结果与Hajiaghayi等人(2025)的结果形成鲜明对比,后者在具有完整分布知识的策略性经纪人下展示了不可近似性结果。我们的结果为在线市场和去中心化交易平台的数据高效经纪机制设计提供了见解,其中中介必须在严重信息限制下促成交易。它们突显了即使最小的数据也能在不确定市场中为经纪人和市场参与者提供稳健且激励相容的经纪服务。

英文摘要:

We initiate the study of single-sample bilateral trade with a broker, drawing an analogy to the setting of single-sample bilateral trade without a broker considered in Babaioff et al. (2020) and Cai and Wu (2023). Our model captures the three-sided interaction in which a broker mediates trade between a buyer and seller, each described by a valuation distribution from which a single sample can be drawn. We consider two settings in particular: one where the valuation distributions of the buyer and seller are identical and one where the valuation distributions are stochastically ordered. We analyze simple mechanisms that rely only on a single sample from each agent's distribution and show that these mechanisms achieve constant-factor approximations to the first-best gains-from-trade (GFT), first-best social welfare (SW), and optimal profit under the standard monotone-hazard-rate assumption. We then complement these results with matching or nearly matching upper bounds on the GFT and SW of our mechanisms. Notably, in both settings, we observe fairly small losses in the approximation factors to the first-best GFT and first-best SW due to the existence of the broker (benchmarked against the corresponding approximation factors in the setting without a broker). Furthermore, our results stand in stark contrast to those of Hajiaghayi et al. (2025), who show inapproximability results under a strategic broker with full distributional knowledge. Our results provide insight into the design of data-efficient brokerage mechanisms for online marketplaces and decentralized trading platforms, where intermediaries must facilitate trade under severe informational constraints. They highlight how even minimal data can enable robust and incentive-compatible brokerage in uncertain markets for both the broker and the market participants.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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