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arXiv 2602.12903cs.GTcs.LG
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上下文在线双边交易

Contextual Online Bilateral Trade

New York University(纽约大学);Sapienza University(萨皮恩扎大学);Google Research(谷歌研究);EPFL(苏黎世联邦理工学院)

Romain Cosson, Federico Fusco, Anupam Gupta, Stefano Leonardi, Renato Paes Leme, Matteo Russo

AI总结:

本文研究了具有上下文性估值的双边交易问题,设计了在两位反馈下实现O(d log d)遗憾的算法,并在一位反馈下允许小负利润的算法,同时探讨了预算平衡与时间范围无关的交易收益算法。

摘要:

我们研究了在卖方和买方的估值具有上下文性时的重复双边交易。更具体地说,代理的估值由一个上下文向量与两个未知的d维向量的内积给出——一个用于买方,一个用于卖方。在每个时间步t,学习者会接收到一个上下文并发布两个价格,一个给卖方,一个给买方,如果双方都接受自己的价格,交易就会发生。我们研究了这个问题的两个目标,即交易收益和利润,并证明了在一种令人惊讶的强基准下具有无遗憾性:最佳全知动态策略。在自然场景中,当学习者分别观察到代理是否接受价格——即所谓的“两位反馈”时,我们设计了实现交易收益的O(d log d)遗憾和利润最大化O(d log log T + d log d)遗憾的算法。这两种结果都是紧致的,除了log(d)因子外,并实现了每一步预算平衡,意味着学习者永远不会产生负利润。在信息较少的“一位反馈”模型中,学习者只观察到交易是否发生。对于这种场景,我们证明了紧致的两位反馈遗憾范围仍然可以实现,但代价是允许学习者可能产生一个顺序O(d log d)的小负利润,这明显与时间范围无关。作为最终的结果,我们研究了一位反馈和每一步预算平衡的结合。在那里,我们设计了一个交易收益算法,其遗憾与时间范围无关,但指数级依赖于维度d。对于利润最大化,我们维持这个指数依赖于维度,其乘以一个log T因子。

英文摘要:

We study repeated bilateral trade when the valuations of the sellers and the buyers are contextual. More precisely, the agents' valuations are given by the inner product of a context vector with two unknown $d$-dimensional vectors -- one for the buyers and one for the sellers. At each time step $t$, the learner receives a context and posts two prices, one for the seller and one for the buyer, and the trade happens if both agents accept their price. We study two objectives for this problem, gain from trade and profit, proving no-regret with respect to a surprisingly strong benchmark: the best omniscient dynamic strategy. In the natural scenario where the learner observes \emph{separately} whether the agents accept their price -- the so-called \emph{two-bit} feedback -- we design algorithms that achieve $O(d\log d)$ regret for gain from trade, and $O(d \log\log T + d\log d)$ regret for profit maximization. Both results are tight, up to the $\log(d)$ factor, and implement per-step budget balance, meaning that the learner never incurs negative profit. In the less informative \emph{one-bit} feedback model, the learner only observes whether a trade happens or not. For this scenario, we show that the tight two-bit regret regimes are still attainable, at the cost of allowing the learner to possibly incur a small negative profit of order $O(d\log d)$, which is notably independent of the time horizon. As a final set of results, we investigate the combination of one-bit feedback and per-step budget balance. There, we design an algorithm for gain from trade that suffers regret independent of the time horizon, but \emph{exponential} in the dimension $d$. For profit maximization, we maintain this exponential dependence on the dimension, which gets multiplied by a $\log T$ factor.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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