（几乎）有效的双边贸易机制
(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
摘要：
我们研究双边贸易问题：一个卖方，一个买方和一个单一的，不可分割的销售项目。众所周知，对于这个问题，没有一个完全有效的激励相容的机制来维持预算平衡。我们设计了简单而强大的机制，利用这些属性获得近似的效率。我们表明，即使是最小的统计数据的使用可以产生良好的近似结果。最后，我们演示了如何在更一般的环境中，这个简单的双边贸易问题的机制可以被用作一个“黑盒子”的机制建设。
英文摘要：
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We design simple and robust mechanisms that obtain approximate efficiency with these properties. We show that even minimal use of statistical data can yield good approximation results. Finally, we demonstrate how a mechanism for this simple bilateral-trade problem can be used as a "black-box" for constructing mechanisms in more general environments.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
