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arXiv 1404.6786cs.GT
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重新分配机制

Reallocation Mechanisms

Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski

摘要:

我们考虑重新分配问题的设置,每个代理人的初始禀赋由一个子集的资源。玩家的私人信息是他们对每个可能的资源子集的价值。目标是在代理之间重新分配资源,以最大限度地提高效率。允许货币转移,但参与是自愿的。我们为几种经典环境开发激励兼容,个人理性和预算平衡的机制,包括双边贸易,伙伴关系解散,Arrow-Debreu市场和组合交易所。我们所有的机制(除了一个)提供了一个恒定的近似,在这些设置中的最佳效率,即使在代理的偏好是复杂的多参数函数。

英文摘要:

We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to redistribute resources among agents to maximize efficiency. Monetary transfers are allowed, but participation is voluntary. We develop incentive-compatible, individually-rational and budget balanced mechanisms for several classic settings, including bilateral trade, partnership dissolving, Arrow-Debreu markets, and combinatorial exchanges. All our mechanisms (except one) provide a constant approximation to the optimal efficiency in these settings, even in ones where the preferences of the agents are complex multi-parameter functions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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