前后均衡与VCG机制
Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms
摘要：
考虑一个不完全信息的抽象社会选择环境，其中选项的数量很大。尽管很自然，但由于禁止性通信约束，实现VCG机制可能不可行。然而，如果参与者将注意力限制在备选方案的一个子集上，可行性可能会恢复。本文刻画了在原博弈中导致事后均衡的子集类。事实证明，这样的子集存在的一个关键条件是存在一个类型独立的最佳社会选择，为每个球员。我们进一步分析这些限制的福利影响。这项工作遵循Holzman，Kfir-Dahav，Monderer和Tennenholtz（2004）以及Holzman和Monderer（2004）的工作，其中对组合拍卖进行了类似的分析。
英文摘要：
Consider an abstract social choice setting with incomplete information, where the number of alternatives is large. Albeit natural, implementing VCG mechanisms may not be feasible due to the prohibitive communication constraints. However, if players restrict attention to a subset of the alternatives, feasibility may be recovered. This paper characterizes the class of subsets which induce an ex-post equilibrium in the original game. It turns out that a crucial condition for such subsets to exist is the existence of a type-independent optimal social alternative, for each player. We further analyze the welfare implications of these restrictions. This work follows work by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004) and Holzman and Monderer (2004) where similar analysis is done for combinatorial auctions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
